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SQUEEZING BLOOD FROM STONES:
THE INCOME TAX INDUSTRY IN CANADA
Lorne Sossin*
RESUMIE
La these de l'auteur est que les petits contribuables sont obligds de payer un
service dont ils ne devraient pas avoir besoin, notamment le pr6l vement sur
le remboursement d'imp6ts. L'auteur fait l'historique des r~glements relatifs
au prdl~vement sur le remboursement d'imp6ts et en conclut qu'un tel
syst~me ne sert qu'a laser les petits contribuables. Au lieu de restreindre de
plus en plus les r~glements relatifs au pr6l vement sur le remboursement
d'imp6ts, Revenu Canada devrait plut6t offrir aux petits contribuables
davantage de services, y compris des services d'aide pour preparer la
declaration d'imp6ts et un syst6me de remboursement mieux appropri6.
I. INTRODUCTION
To discourage the use of credit as a subsistence income supplement requires
policies that promote stable economic growth and employment opportunities
for all social and economic classes and, ultimately, a guaranteed annual
income. Regulation of the debtor-creditor relationship will not touch the heart
of the problem of overcommitment: insufficient income.1
[T]ax rebate discounting is socially unacceptable. The industry creates its
own demand, it exploits the poor and it exploits fear. There are no benefits,
social or economic, to be gained from discounting, except for those who
profit from it.... By taking their customer's money, tax discounters do not
perform a service, they only reinforce their impoverishment and powerless-
ness.2
* Copyright © 1992 Lome Sossin.
I wish to thank Rueben Hasson, Neil Brooks, Ron Manzer, Richard Day and Carolyn
Tuohy for their helpful comments and encouragement..
1. M. Trebilcock, "The Pathology of Credit Breakdown" (1976) 22 McGill L.J. 415 at
453.
2. M. Milczynski, "Tax Rebate Discounting in Canada: The Case For Abolition"
(1987) 2 Journal of Law and Social Policy 77 at 90.
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The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the income tax discounting
industry in Canada. What I wish to argue is that an analysis of the income tax
discounting industry reveals the way in which the redistributive premise of
the income tax has been undermined by the privatization of perhaps the most
important aspect of tax administration for low-income taxpayers, namely, the
delivery of tax refunds and credits. In the case of the income tax industry, it
is ultimately those low-income consumers with limited access to credit who
are compelled to pay for a service they ought not to need.
Paying taxes is, like avoiding or evading them, a form of political interaction.
The process of voluntary tax compliance in some sense both reflects and
reproduces the pattern of social relations which characterize the welfare state.
The welfare state initially represented an accommodation between capital
and labour interests to institutionalize class conflict and thus permit a regu-
lated form of market capitalism to sustain itself. As a result of the growth of
these mediating institutions and the increasing pervasiveness of state inter-
vention in the market, however, citizens have become transformed into
dependent clients and consumers. The result of both of these trends is that
the market itself has become depoliticized-people are reduced to interacting
with bureaucracies as acquisitive, contractual parties. For clients with few
resources to bargain strategically in this interest-group dominated policy
process, and little understanding of the stakes of the process or their interests
in it, this often results in disempowerment and exploitation.
This is especially prevalent in the case of the income tax, which requires
taxpayers to assess their own liability to the state, or more typically for
low-income Canadians, the state's liability to them in the form of a refund or
tax credit. This process ought to be empowering for low-income taxpayers,
however its privatization by tax discounters results in the opposite occurring.
This industry has emerged out of, and profited by, the ignorance, fear and
poverty of the least advantaged sector of consumers. The aim of this paper
is to account for this disempowerment and to suggest the most appropriate
path to redressing it.
Income tax discounters range widely in size, rates, reliability and expertise,
though most operate by deducting a portion of a refund as a "fee" for filling
out the taxpayer's return and providing a discounted refund in advance of
when the government makes the refund available. This enterprise has mush-
roomed in Canada despite the fact that a central part of Revenue Canada's
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mandate is to provide free and complete taxfiling services, and the fact that
the returns themselves have becomes increasingly simplified.3
While the problem of tax discounting has been canvassed previously both
from the standpoint of the legislative debate surrounding the federal regula-
tion of the industry and from the standpoint of the policy rationales against
legitimating the industry through such regulation, 4 I propose to analyze tax
discounting from the related but somewhat broader vantage of consumer
disempowerment. What I wish to argue is that, contrary to the purpose of a
progressive redistributive income tax, which is precisely the empowerment
of socioeconomically disadvantaged citizens, the tax discounting industry
instead has transformed the income tax into merely another consumer rela-
tionship over which low-income citizens with few resources exercise little
choice, and of which these taxpayers have little understanding. The story of
the tax discounting industry's regulation becomes, then, the reflection of how
little influence low-income consumers have over the market in which they
are more or less captive, and by which they are further disempowered.
This essay is divided into three parts. The first part provides the context into
which tax rebate discounting emerged, emphasizing both the growing fear
and mistrust of Revenue Canada and the scarcity of credit for low-income
Canadians that combined to create a favourable climate for the rise of a
private, money-lending tax rebate service. The second part charts the growth
of the tax discounting industry and the government's attempt to regulate it.
The third part analyzes the disempowerment of low-income consumers that
is reinforced and reproduced through conventional consumer protection
legislation. Finally, by way of conclusion, I shall argue that the solution to
the problem of tax discounting lies not with reforms to consumer statutes,
but with redefining income tax administration so as to transform the tax
process into an empowering experience in political participation for the poor.
3. Indeed, calculating programs currently exist that would allow taxpayers to fill in
their returns merely by answering a series of prompted questions. The resulting
information could be sent electronically to Ottawa, and a print-out provided for the
taxpayer's records. Rather than making these programs available for free at Revenue
Canada district offices, the department decided instead to allow this service to
become privatized. See "Jelinek Pushes Computerized Tax Returns" Globe & Mail,
March 18, 1992, A4; see generally R. Couzin, "Simplification and Reform" (1988)
26 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 435
4. See Milczynski, supra, note 2; E. Belobaba, "Regulating the Income Tax Dis-
counter: A Study in Arbitrary Government" (1979) 1 Canadian Taxation 21; and R.
Hasson "In Defence of Simple Solutions for Simple Problems-A Reply" (1979) 1
Canadian Taxation 25.
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II. SERVICE OVER ENFORCEMENT: REVENUE
CANADA AND CONSUMERISM IN THE 1980s
I intend to begin my study where most other critical analyses of tax discount-
ing have ended, namely with Revenue Canada. Advocates of abolishing tax
discounting argue that Revenue Canada should provide accelerated service
to low-income taxpayers so that their refunds arrive sooner, thus obviating
the market for tax rebate discounting. I contend that while delays in returning
refunds, economic need and the lack of alternative sources of consumer credit
for low-income taxpayers may be said to have caused the problem of tax
discounting, it is not coincidental that the income tax industry emerged and
flourished in the mid-1970s and 1980s at a time when Revenue Canada was
subject to an intensive negative public relations campaign that fostered fear
and mistrust of the tax administrator. It is, in other words, the politics of tax
administration as much as its procedures, that provided the conditions for the
growth of tax discounting.
Led by the Conservatives while in opposition, a groundswell of protest
against Revenue Canada had, by the early 1980s, come to embody the
disenchantment many Canadian people felt towards Trudeau's liberal gov-
ernment, and the Canadian welfare state generally. The Conservatives estab-
lished a task force to roam the country conducting public hearings on what
was termed, "Revenue Canada's abuse of Canadian taxpayers." S Pierre
Bussieres, the beleaguered liberal Minister responsible for Revenue Canada,
defensively commissioned his own internal report on the Department from a
high-profile consulting firm. 6 Revenue Canada's mandate, whether to
enforce the Act and treat taxpayers as potential tax evaders, or to provide
services to the public, became for the first time the subject of intense interest
in the media, in the legislatures, and on street-corners throughout Canada.
The catalyst for the events that culminated in the flurry of task forces and
reports maligning Revenue Canada, and that seemed to touch a raw national
nerve, was the allegation that tax assessors in the Kitchener, Ontario district
office operated under performance quotas as a result of which they were
required to recover a certain amount of taxes in order to qualify for satisfac-
5. See P. Beatty, Progressive Conservative Task Force on Revenue Canada (Ottawa:
1984).
6. This report started under the Liberals was completed after the Tories had taken
power and largely mirrors the Beatty Task Force's Report though it is much broader
and more detailed. See W. Farlinger (Woods Gordon), Report on Revenue Canada(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1984)
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tory performance ratings. The story broke when a collections officer garnered
the bank account of a single mother only to find it was a joint account with
her son. Headlines in the local paper the following day satirized the attempt
by Revenue Canada to gouge a young boy's savings. The Department at first
denied the allegations of a quota system, then admitted them in part. One tax
assessor tendered a public letter of resignation, and the tax collection prac-
tices of Revenue Canada quickly became a regular topic of conversation in
Parliament.
Tales of harassment quickly emerged from virtually every corner of the
country, which all more or less contained a similar theme; innocent, middle-
class taxpayers (usually small business-owners, dentists, other professionals,
fishermen, artists, or artisans) found themselves hounded by Revenue
Canada's aggressive auditors and victimized by what became widely per-
ceived as the tax department's incompetence. 7 The most excoriating treat-
ment occurred in conservative newspapers such as the Toronto Sun, which
ran headlines such as "RevCan like Gestapo," and "Revenue Canada's a
Monster: Feds Built Frankenstein." 8
The media typically focused on one taxpayer's struggle against an imposing
and faceless administrative behemoth. The story of Miriam Waddington
exemplifies this pattern. 9 She was a poet nearing retirement in 1984, and
recounts the tragi-comic tale of how revenue officials hounded her about
travel and household expenses; they assumed since she was working on a
book that she must be wealthy and hiding her income from the tax depart-
ment. She professed, "I feel harassed and insulted just because I am an artist
... they go after people who can't protect themselves-older women, retired
professors-who can't hire tax helpers, who don't have tax shelters and who
lack the income to buy them." 10
One tax collector with whom I spoke confirmed the impression that Revenue
Canada was out to get "the little guy," but this situation, he explained, had
7. See for example, R. MacDonald, "Tax Horror Tales Pile Up," The Sunday Sun, Feb-
mary 19, 1984, 30; J. Spears, "Ottawa's Tax Men Accused of 'Moral Blackmail"',
Toronto Star, December 30, 1983, F1; J. Ruimy, "Is the Taxman Getting Too
Tough?", Toronto Star, January 21, 1984, B5; and A. Gould, "Introducing Four of
Revenue Canada's Victims Who've Had Enough," Canadian Business, April 1984,
39-48.
8. See the Toronto Sun, March 22, 1984, 31; and March 28, 1984, 3.
9. See Canadian Business, supra note 7 at 39-40.
10. Ibid., 40.
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far more to do with the socio-economic context of tax collection, than with
the heartlessness of the Department's officials:
Suppose that a business is represented by a good tax lawyer and a good
accountant, they get respect. Some guy has a shop, is an immigrant maybe,
not very sophisticated, does not hire a professional because either he can't
afford do or doesn't want to spend the money, he's going to be pounced on.
In that sense, there seems to be a cowardice in the bureaucracy that adminis-
ters the Act even now.
It was not the inequities in tax planning, however, that were identified as the
source of Revenue Canada's lack of even-handedness. Rather, the bureau-
cracy was portrayed as omnipotent and every taxpayer a helpless victim.
Even the New Democratic Party added its voice to the chorus of critics of
Revenue Canada's enforcement practices. The image of the wealthy elite of
Canada, flanked by an entourage of tax lawyers and accountants, exploiting
a myriad of tax breaks, deferrals, deductions and loopholes, had successfully
been replaced by the image of the embattled small businessperson, whose
hard earned profits were being siphoned by callous tax collectors. Between
1982 and 1983, the number of Canadians who believed that Revenue Canada
treated taxpayers "fairly" dropped from 60 to 54 per cent. 11
Perrin Beatty exclaimed upon the publication of the report of the Progressive
Conservative Task Force on Revenue Canada, "The first impression we had
was the fear in which National Revenue is held by so many Canadians." 12
What Beatty did not speculate on is the extent to which the atmosphere of
fear his report and the public hearings which preceded it, had contributed to,
rather than merely reflected, the climate of the country.
The image created (or, perhaps, merely amplified) by the report was of a
cynical, self-serving bureaucracy confronting an honest but suspicious
taxpaying public. Beatty's task force heard that Revenue Canada "have
demoralized and created fear and mistrust among the people" in Charlotte-
town, 13 that the department is "unfair, chauvinistic, vindictive and out to grab
11. This poll was conducted by Revenue Canada and reported in the Toronto Star, Feb-
ruary 6, 1984, A10.
12. This remark was quoted in an editorial which appeared in the Globe & Mail, Tues-
day, April 10, 1984. Beatty elaborates on this theme in the report, where it is noted,
"What we heard disturbed us deeply. We were struck by the fear with which ordi-
nary Canadians greet a call from the tax department, a fear that is sometimes culti-
vated by Revenue Canada in its attempts to frighten ordinary taxpayers." See
Beatty, supra note 5, 3.
13. Globe and Mail, March 15, 1984.
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every tax dollar it can," in Thunder Bay,14 and that "taxpayers may resort to,
violence if Revenue Canada continues to harass, abuse and intimidate them,"
in Kitchener. 15
With the Progressive Conservative government in power, what had been a
tacit feature of Canada's tax system since the tax reform of 1972 became
explicit, namely, that tax avoidance measures open only to the minority of
mostly high-income taxpayers earning income from business or property,
were to be, in effect, encouraged and rewarded by the government; this gave
expression not only to the agenda of the New Right to allow those with capital
to keep more of their income and thereby stimulate investment and growth,
but also to the crassly partisan nature in which Revenue Canada had become
an instrument for the Conservative's bid for power. As one prominent
accountant recounts,
The government often increased the rewards for those who could stretch the
law, often introducing tax shelters and incentives. This resulted in enormous
monetary pay-offs to a flourishing tax avoidance industry, in which stagger-
ing profits could be earned by underwriters, promoters, middlemen and con-
sultants who could mine the Income TaxAct ... 16
The government issued a document shortly after assuming power entitled,
"Revenue Canada, Taxation's Mandate and Operational Principles." 17
Among the "Operational Objectives", the word "enforcement" does not
appear once, whereas the "rights and needs of taxpayers," "good service to
the public," and "accountability to guarantee that the system is operated
efficiently and fairly" are all given prominent attention. Under the heading
"services to the public," eleven paragraphs are set out (as opposed to the mere
five operating principles that precede them), detailing the courteous, infor-
mative, and helpful approach to tax administration that Revenue Canada
officials are to adopt.18
14. The Chronicle-Journal, March 9, 1984, 1.
15. Toronto Star, March 7, 1984, A3.
16. I. Rosen, "Overview of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule," in The World According
to GAAR (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association, 1990), 2.
17. Issued under the authority of the Minister of National Revenue, July 26, 1984.
18. Ibid., 6. Paragraph 8 is of particular interest; it states, "good service to the public
also requires effective communications with tax practitioners so as to obtain and
maintain their trust and cooperation."
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By the close of the 1980s, the budgetary and ideological shift from tax enforce-
ment to taxpayer services had transformed the perception, if not the operation,
of tax administration in Canada. One tangible and far-reaching consequence of
this shift is that the number of audits of high-income taxpayers and investigations
for tax evasion decreased steadily during the second half of the 1980s.19
Although Revenue Canada was now presented to the Canadian public as a
declawed service bureaucracy, these same forces created a climate in which
few taxpayers were encouraged to trust the public bureaucracy with their tax
preparation. Indeed, it is Revenue Canada's main client base, namely high-
income Canadians, who regularly (through their lawyers and accountants)
tangle with tax officials over complex tax avoidance and tax planning
schemes, that arguably benefitted most by the turn away from enforcement
and toward the provision of service. The legacy left to low-income taxpayers
was both a fear of the tax bureaucracy, and an allure for tax avoidance which
seemed dependent on obtaining the expertise of a "tax professional."
By the early 1990s, Revenue Canada itself has begun to speak of tax
administration as an exercise in "customer service." In June of 1991 at the
National Director's conference held in Montebello, Quebec, 130 senior tax
administrators met to discuss such topics as "Reaching Out to New Clients"
and "Service Through Leadership." 20 Like any good restaurant or hotel,
taxpayers are now asked to fill out cards rating the service of regional offices;
an investigation of the change in tax administration reported confidently that,
"The department expects the cards will help in its effort to provide a
genuinely friendly service. '21
The main beneficiaries of Revenue Canada's new kinder and gentler brand
of administering the income tax have been, as noted earlier, the wealthy.2 2
19. In 1982, nearly 2% of individuals were subject to an income tax audit (the over-
whelming majority of these would target high-income individuals); by 1990, this
figure had dropped to below 1%. Corporate audits declined as well over this period,
and the number of tax evasion prosecutions fell by approximately 25%. See Report
of theAuditor General, 1990 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1990), 560-2.
20. For a report of this gathering, see S. Slutsky, "Revenue Canada Tries to Put on a
Happy Face," in The Financial Post, November 13, 1991, 14.
21. Ibid.
22. A recent internal audit of Revenue Canada discloses, for example, that delinquent
accounts have risen to an unprecedented $3.5 billion. Even the government con-
cedes that the department has leaned "too far in the direction of service and permis-
siveness." See "Friendly Persuasion a Taxing Problem" Globe & Mail, March 22,
1992, A4.
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While high-income taxpayers often assume an adversarial posture with the
tax collector, the majority of taxpayers only come into contact with Revenue
Canada when they receive their tax refund on income withheld at the source
of their employment. For the fiscal year 1988-89, for example, 17,615,022
tax returns were filed; of these, 13,048,144 taxpayers received a refund from
the government. 23 Although it is possible for taxpayers to calculate the exact
refund owing to them at the close of a calendar year, they must wait
approximately three months before receiving the cheque from the govern-
ment.
While this delay in acquiring refunds had characterized tax administration
throughout the postwar era, it was in the credit scarce years of stagflation in
the mid-1970s that small-scale money-lenders began offering to discount
these tax refunds and providing the recipients with the cash immediately upon
calculating the refund owing.24 The refund thus served as collateral enabling
someone regardless of their credit rating to obtain a short-term loan. This
service, however, came at a high price. By the late 1970s, unregulated
discount rates were reaching as high as 40-50 per cent, or expressed as an
annual rate of interest, approximately 200 per cent. 25 Exploring the dynamics
of this income tax industry, and its implications for low income consumers,
will be the subject of the following section.
III. TAX REBATE DISCOUNTING: REGULATION
AND PRIVATIZATION
At the same time as Revenue Canada was allegedly being transformed into
a "service" bureaucracy by the Progressive Conservatives, tax rebate dis-
counting was growing rapidly into a large and profitable "service" industry
in Canada. In 1984, the industry generated revenues of a quarter of a billion
dollars and forty-one million dollars in profit.26 This industry is mass-mar-
keted in the months leading up to the taxfiling deadline of April 30, and target
23. Revenue Canada, Inside Taxation, 1988-89 (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1989).
24. For a description of the rise of the tax rebate discounting industry, see E. Belobaba,
supra note 4. Belobaba characterizes the rise of tax discounters as occurring "over-
night," noting the main source of clients centred in inner-city low-income districts.
25. Ibid.
26. Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, "Tax Rebate Discounting: A Discussion
Paper," (June 1985), 1.
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low and middle income taxpayers to whom they claim to offer "case in hand,"
and "peace of mind."'27
Martha Milczynski, an advocate for the abolition of the tax rebate discounting
industry describes, the process by which the transaction occurs:
A person must take all their tax information slips to the tax discounter. She
or he must provide their social insurance number and written authorization
... The discounter then prepares the return and the customer signs an agree-
ment or contract. This document is usually drafted in the form of a purchase
and sale agreement and includes the assignment of power of attorney over to
the discounter limited to the nature of the transaction ... The client then
receives a cheque for at least 85 per cent of the value of the full refund. The
15 per cent share for the discounter is all inclusive; there cannot be any other
additional charges for tax return preparation. The entire process takes as little
as a few hours or up to two days.28
Milczynski goes on to chronicle a variety of abuses to which consumers of
this service have been subjected (most commonly filling out one return for
the benefit of the client and a return claiming a much higher refund which is
then sent to Revenue Canada); interestingly, responsibility for enforcing the
provisions of the Act lay with the Consumer Services Branch of the Ministry
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, not with Revenue Canada. Revenue
Canada will, however, notify Consumer and Corporate Affairs if unregistered
discounters come to their attention, and do routinely provide statistics on the
number of taxpayers who utilize discounters and related data.
Revenue Canada also figures in the popularity of tax discounting. Among the
reasons cited by the tax rebate discounter's association to account for the
industry's popularity is that, "people fear Revenue Canada and are intimi-
dated by any contact with the department. ' 2 9 At first glance, it makes little
sense that individuals, whose only interaction with a government department
is the receipt of a cheque (and which, unlike other welfare departments, issues
the cheque unconditionally once a return is filed, with no subsequent follow-
up contact or supervision), should be intimidated or afraid. It is only in the
context of the general disdain for the "red tape" of bureaucracy and the
27. See L. Sloane, "Doing Taxes for the Lazy, the Nervous, and the Rich," New York
Times, January 12, 1992, 10. H & R Block's director of marketing in the United
States, Jeanie Lauer, is quoted as commenting that the company views its competi-
tion as individuals who fill out their own tax returns.
28. Milczynski, supra, note 2 at 77.
29. The Canadian Tax Refund Discounters Association, "Position Paper on Tax Rebate
Discounting" (May 1985).
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specific vilification of Revenue Canada in the 1980s, that this reaction
becomes explicable. It is also worth noting, that the main clients of this
industry include some of the people with the fewest resources and fewest
skills for interacting with government-immigrants, and the poor.30
A closer examination of the tax discount rebating market reveals the vulner-
ability of its client base. Over 63% of the 385,000 discounter's clients in 1985
earned less than $8,000 annually.31 Only 11% of those clients reported
incomes that exceeded $20,000 and nearly one-third reported incomes of
below $2,000. The average tax discounted refund, including the child tax
credit which until reforms in 1985 comprised close to 40% of the industry's
revenues, was $800. H & R Block, the largest tax discounter in Canada
operating over 1,000 outlets, reported that only 20% of the returns it pro-
cesses exceed $1,000.32 Nevertheless, by 1982, the company was posting
profits of over $25 million in Canada. The Tax Refund Discounter's Associ-
ation itself concluded, "on the whole, we help people whom other traditional
lenders and providers of credit will not assist."'33
As an advocate from the Association Cooperative d'economie familiale argues,
We are not opposed to companies filling out tax returns. We are opposed to
people having to buy their tax refund ... we think it is immoral to sell their
own refund to people who are supposed to be reimbursed by the govern-
ment. We are talking about the very poor and about the fact that a good part
of their refund is paid to discounters because of Revenue Canada's delay in
sending out the refund. 34
The tax discounters themselves, naturally, portray their business somewhat
differently:
Tax discounting is a unique business and should not be compared to conven-
tional money-lending. We enter into a buy-sell agreement with a client, but
are dependent on a third party, which is Revenue Canada, to repay us. The
cost of the service is the discount percentage, similar to commission percent-
ages paid in the real estate or stock brokerage business ... In the final analy-
sis, it is dollars, not annual percentages, that determines an effective price
and resultant profit. That is why the banks and other national financial insti-
30. National Anti-Poverty Organization, "Tax Rebate Discounting" (August 1985).
31. See House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative
Committee on Bill C-83" [hereinafter Minutes] December 10, 12, 1985, 1:15.
32. Ibid., 1:60.
33. Ibid., 1:32.
34. Ibid., 1:13.
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tutions are not interested in providing an alternative service-loans on small
amounts for short periods of time and without repeat or other types of sale
potential, simply do not produce enough dollar revenue to cover expenses or
opening an account, let alone prepare an income tax return ... 35
Tax discounting became something of a cause celebre for the media in the late
1970s, which decried this new brand of money-lender as little more than a loan
shark.36 The public outcry led to a variety of legislative action at a provincial
level.37 Rather than abolish the industry, however, as the U.S. chose to do,38 or
reform Revenue Canada's system of delivering refunds and credit in order to
make tax discounting unnecessary as the Senate committee on banking, trade
and commerce suggested after conducting hearings on possible policy alterna-
tives, 39 the federal government decided instead to regulate it, enacting the Tax
Rebate DiscountingAct (TRDA) in 1978.40 The ostensible goal of the legislation
was to provide uniform discount rates, and standards of disclosure, while
ensuring a "reasonable profit" for tax discounters.41
The TRDA provided that the portion of the refund that the discounter could
legally charge was limited to 15 per cent (for a low-risk loan that rarely
exceeds three months and can extend over as little as three or four weeks);
expressed as an interest rate, this fee would, conservatively based on four
months for the refund to arrive, top 60 per cent annually. For a return
processed in three months, this rate would jump to over 90 per cent.
Regulation of tax discounting resulted in consistent growth for the industry.
From 1974 to 1984, the percentage of taxfilers making use of professional
services rose from 17 per cent to 37 per cent, in large part due to the impact
of tax discounters. One of the reasons for the industry's rise is that entering
35. Ibid., 1:34.
36. See Toronto Star, April 30, 1977; and Globe & Mail, November 9, 1977.
37. See Income Tax DiscountersAct, S.O. 1977, c.55 which mandated that tax discount-
ing be limited to 5%; Manitoba and Saskatchewan passed similar statutes, while the
B.C. Consumer Protection Act limited the discount to 15%. Quebec has made it
illegal to discount any refund given under the provincial income tax.
38. In fact, tax discounting is not itself illegal in the U.S., but a regulation enforced by
the Internal Revenue Service makes the practice subject to a civil penalty of $500.
39. Canadian Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Proceed-
ings, No. 36, April 19-20, 1978, at 42-44
40. R.S.C. 1985, T-3. For a review of previous attempts to regulate tax rebate discount-
ing at the provincial level, see E. Belobaba, supra note 4.
41. H. of C. Debates, April 17, 1978, p.4590 quoted in Belobaba supra, note 4 at 22.
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the income tax business is extremely easy. In order to become a tax dis-
counter, an individual or business need only register with the Ministry of
Consumer and Corporate Affairs, obtain a discounter code (in return for
which the address of the discounter and the address where refunds are to be
mailed must be disclosed), and the requisite number of Schedule I and II
forms needed.42 No investigation is undertaken of prospective discounters,
and no criteria have been set out, other than the possession a mailing address,
on the basis of which to refuse to register a tax discounter.
i) Enforcement
Reuben Hasson, writing shortly after the passage of the Tax Rebate Discount-
ingAct, warned that its enforcement would be hampered in part by an absence
of complainants.43 This prediction has largely come to pass. Last year, the
Ministry received approximately 75 complaints regarding tax discounting
(out of approximately one million returns which are currently being dis-
counted annually); nearly all these complaints concerned clients disgruntled
over attempts by a discounter to recover debts incurred as a result of the
discounter having overestimated the refund owed by Revenue Canada.44
Given the skills of the majority of tax discounters' clients and the complexity
of the arrangements involved, it thus falls to the Ministry with the occasional
tip from Revenue Canada or an outsider, to effectively police the Act.
The Act sets out a variety of offences to be. enforced by the Ministry of
Consumer and Corporate Affairs; these include the failure to disclose
required information (i.e. expected refund from government, amount pro-
vided to taxpayer after discounting service charge, payment as a percentage
of expected refund, and the discount rate expressed as an annual interest rate),
failure to give client notice of the actual amount of the refund and finally the
failure to maintain records and provide Ministry access to those records. 45
All the offences contained in the Act are punishable on summary conviction
and subject to a maximum fine of $25,000,46 and proceedings may be
instituted at any time within two years of the commission of the offence. 47
42. These requirements are set out in "Tax Rebate Discounting Act: Procedures Manual
for Discounters," Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 4th edition, 1988.
See appendix for copies of Schedule I and II.
43. Hasson, supra note 4.
44. Conversation with Marion Clark, Senior Administrator for Tax Discounting, Minis-
try of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, March 3, 1992.
45. See sections 4-7.
46. Section 7.
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While comprehensive statistics are difficult to obtain, and are not compiled
systematically by the Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, it is
possible to sketch in broad strokes the scope of enforcement under the TRDA.
As outlined below, there are currently a little over 200 discounters in Canada.
The Ministry conducts random annual audits of a significant proportion of
these discounters, though most are "paper audits" carried out by mail rather
than on-site audits which are generally costly.48 Approximately between ten
and twenty investigations result from these audits or from other tips (gener-
ally from Revenue Canada).49 Of these investigations, two or three are
referred to the RCMP for prosecution. 50 Marion Clark, the senior adminis-
trator of the Act, noted that on average, one or two convictions are entered,
though it is not rare for there to be no convictions in a given year; moreover,
the penalties are rarely substantial either due to the amounts of money
involved or the practice of plea bargaining.51 Summaries of these successful
prosecutions are enclosed in newsletters distributed to all registered tax
discounters as a form of deterrence.52
These summaries are representative of the types of offenders violating the
Act. Bonnell Cole Computer Services Ltd. of Cornerbrook Newfoundland,
for example, pleaded guilty on February 2, 1989 to six counts under s.3(1)
of the Act for acquiring the right to refund tax for less than the minimum
consideration allowed and one count under s.4(1)(a) which stipulates that the
discounter must pay the client by cash or cheque the full payment required.
The company was fined $500 on each count for a total of $4,000. Another
recent case involved Accucash Tax Refund Service of Toronto. This dis-
counter pleaded guilty to three counts under s.3(1) and three counts under
s.4(1)(b)(i) for not disclosing required information to clients. The woman
who operated the company received a conditional discharge, six months
probation, and 75 hours community service.
In one of the larger recent cases, Paul Fontaine of La Roche, Saskatchewan
was convicted on September 20, 1991 of 75 charges under s.5(b) of the Act
47. Section 8.
48. Conversation with Marion Clark, supra note 44.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. See, for example, Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, "Convictions under the
Tax Rebate Discounting Act" (IB-10312/ 1991-07).
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which requires the discounter to advise the client of the actual refund received
from Revenue Canada using a prescribed form. He was also convicted under
s.6.1 of providing false or misleading information to a peace officer respon-
sible for the administration of the Act. This discounter had previously been
convicted under the Act in 1988. Mr. Fontaine received a suspended sentence
of 18 months in relation to these charges and fined a total of $7,500.
The paucity of complainants and paltriness of the fines for convicted dis-
counters are indicative of the problems with enforcing consumer protection
legislation-it tends to reproduce and legitimate a certain relationship
between vendor and consumer rather than intervene effectively on the
consumer's behalf. This trend is further reinforced by the judicial treatment
of such legislation.
ii) Case-Law
Even prior to the enactment of the TRDA, the courts were reluctant to find
tax discounting unconscionable.53 Representative of the judiciary's approach
to consumer protection generally, the approach to tax discounting they
initially favoured was to proceed on a case by case basis to determine the
legality of the practice. 54 There have been extremely few reported decisions
interpreting the TRDA, 55 and none at all since its revamping in 1985 (dis-
cussed below). This is a reflection of the small numbers of prosecutions
launched, the frequency of plea bargaining, and perhaps also the low priority
given to consumer protection litigation involving relatively small amounts
of money. The first reported case examining the TRDA, predictably, involved
a challenge to the constitutionality of the federal government's entry into the
field of tax discount regulation. In Krassman v. The Queen,56 the legislation
was upheld as intra vires the federal government's criminal law power.
In R. v. Takiff,57 a convicted discounter with two previous convictions was
sentenced on a total of sixteen counts to a fine of $100 and restitution. The
Crown's appeal of this sentence on the basis of its excessive leniency was
dismissed; the discounter in question operated alone and was nearly 72 years
old at the time. The Crown similarly lost their appeal (this time from an
53. Hanson Director of Trade Practices v. John's Tax Service, (March 5, 1975)
(B.C.S.C.)[unreported]
54. Ibid.
55. See also discussion of case law in Milczynski, supra, note 2 at 78-80.
56. (1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 262 (Fed. Ct.).
57. (1983), 49 N.B.R. (2d) 203 (N.B.Q.B.).
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acquittal) in R. v. Theissen.58 In this case, consideration for the discounting
of a client's tax refund was given in the form of a reduction on a pre-existing
debt obligation between the two parties. This was held to not constitute a
discounting arrangement as no consideration by cash or cheque changed
hands, and thus the violation of the disclosure requirements of the Act were
held inapplicable.
In R. v. Bowes, 59 the convicted discounter won an appeal to have her sentence
reduced based on her reputation in the community, cooperation with author-
ities, restitution of the monies owing, and the fact that the trial judge erred in
considering additional potential infractions that were not in issue. The judge
compared infractions of the Act with tax evasion, implying that these were
mere regulatory or administrative violations, not genuine criminal offences.
What these two violations clearly share, in my view, is the manipulation of
the income tax process resulting in the defrauding of low-income Canadians.
The imbalance of the court's approach to fraud is further dramatized by the
fact that defrauding unemployment insurance or welfare schemes continue
to commonly result in incarceration. 60 It is thus not so much the fraudulent
activity that determines criminality in the eyes of the court, but rather who
benefits from the fraud.
What emerges from all of these reported decisions, and the unreported
convictions outlined earlier, is an undercurrent in both RCMP and judicial
thinking that violations of tax discounting are not to be taken seriously. The
offenders are generally small-businesspeople; the offences usually unsophis-
ticated. The victims of these offences have little status in the general com-
munity, fewer skills and resources than other victims of theft or fraud, and
the amounts of money involved are generally small (except of course in the
eyes of the low-income consumers). Marion Clark confided that while the
Ministry issues press releases on convictions regularly, they are almost never
picked up as newsworthy by the media-in contrast to the saturation of the
media with positive adds by H & R Block and other large discounters during
the taxfiling season, with promises of quick, hassle-free "cash-back" and the
lure of what this money can buy.
58. [1983] 5 W.W.R. 595.
59. (1983), 5 W.W.R. 374 (Alta CA.).
60. See for a discussion of this issue, R. Hasson, "Tax Evasion and Social Security
Abuse-Some Tentative Observations" (1980) 2 Canadian Taxation, 106
(1992) 8 Journal of Law and Social Policy
The disadvantage of the low-income consumer in the case of tax discounting
is thus reinforced in the legislation, its enforcement and its adjudication.
Accounting for this disempowering experience with consumer protection
policy for low income people will be the subject of the following section.
IV. CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION AND
THE INCOME TAX INDUSTRY
There are a number of methods by which the state can intervene in the market
to protect vulnerable consumers: these include requiring disclosure of certain
information, setting guidelines or standards, licensing, and price controls or
interest rate ceilings. 61 The government has utilized each of these mecha-
nisms in the case of the TRDA. However, as Milczynski notes, the media
continued to focus on the "inherent injustice" of tax discounting even after
the TRDAwas enacted. 62 Further government intervention seemed necessary
to shore up both the industry's image and the credibility of the government
itself. The Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs released a discussion
paper of proposed amendments in June of 1985 as a response to calls for
reform.
In addition, a consultation process was launched to reform the legislation.
Despite growing calls for the abolition of the industry altogether, the Ministry
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs proposed five relatively modest initia-
tives: 1) reducing the cost of tax discounting; 2) improving the administration
and enforcement of the Act; 3) instituting periodic payments of the Child Tax
Credit; 4) encouraging alternative sources of discounting services at banks
and credit unions; and 5) launching a consumer information program.63
These actual legislative amendments forwarded were relatively minor revi-
sions to the disclosure and record-keeping provisions, as well as an alteration
in the rates that could be charged by the tax discounter.
While the rate of return for tax discounters remained at 15% on the first $300
of a tax return, only 5% could be discounted on any remaining portion of a
return above this amount. The tax discounting industry claimed that this
would put them out of business, and that a black market in tax returns would
arise in its wake to victimize low-income Canadians. 64 As the following
61. See I. Ramsay, Consumer Protection: Texts and Materials (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicholson, 1989) at 67-72.
62. Milcyzynski, supra, note 2 at 83.
63. Minutes, supra, note 31 at 2:1.
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figures from the Ministry of consumer and Corporate Affairs indicate, how-
ever, the change in rates enacted in late 1985 and applicable to the 1986
taxfiling season proved far from fatal to the industry. Like the initial experi-
ence with state regulation in 1978, the effect of the 1985 amendments seems
to have been the consolidation rather than the contraction of the income tax
industry, as the following figures from the Ministry of Consumer and Cor-
porate Affairs illustrate:
Table 1
Year Tax Discount Companies Locations
1984 256 1497
1985 220 1549
1986 191 1486
1987 182 1474
1988 207 1596
1989 210 1653
Not only has the number of discounter outlets risen since the 1985 amend-
ments, but more significantly, the number of clients and the volume of profits
has escalated steadily.
Table 2
Total Refunds Value of Refunds Average Value
Discounted Discounted ($) of Disc. Return
1986 722,251 537,715,631 744
1987 880,587 605,329,974 687
1988 906,537 686,874,615 758
1989 965,889 827,735,280 857
1990 1,025,264 917,989,656 895
1991 1,171,641 1,073,123,539 916
64. Ibid., 1:33.
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Those observers critical of the government's attempt at reform would likely
not be surprised by these figures. Milczynski, for example, surveyed the
governments proposals for reforming the tax rebate discounting industry in
1985 and characterized the Minister's suggestions as "showing a callousness
and lack of concern. His initiatives will not bring about meaningful change
but protect an industry that should not exist at all."
These sentiments echo the position taken in the consultations by the National
Anti-Poverty Organization (NAP). 65 NAP favoured repealing the TRDA, and
adopting the American approach of making tax discounting a civil offence.
NAP also reported rumours circulating about "fly-by-night" discounters who
travel to remote communities, and specifically native reserves, and exact
huge profits on exorbitant discounting rates before disappearing. The
National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) presented a brief
supporting NAP's position and emphasizing the detrimental consequences of
single mothers discounting their child tax credits.
Another reform that emerged in 1985 with respect to tax discounting was the
institution of periodic payments of the child tax credit over three intervals
during the year, so as to minimize the business this credit generated for the
tax discounters. 66 This recommendation was made by NAC, who argued that
tax discounting, because it relied for 40% of its revenue on the child tax credit,
had a disproportionately negative effect on female consumers and especially
single mothers with low incomes. This was one area in which NAC and the
NAP diverged; the latter argued that the child tax credit represented the only
lump sum large enough to enable low-income families to purchase expensive
durable goods, and therefore should be preserved.
Briefs were also submitted by H & R Block and the Tax Refund Discounter's
Association, maintaining that the service they provided was meeting a
demand for low-income consumer credit and that the proposed rates were
only barely sufficient to cover costs. Furthermore, they claimed that aiding
low-income taxpayers in the preparation of their income tax returns consti-
tuted a "valuable social service." The H & R Block representative,
revealingly, portrayed his company as the advocate of low-income Canadians
in their interaction with Revenue Canada:
Revenue Canada is a collection and assessing agency. We should not expect
that a collection and assessing agency of that dimension with the number of
65. See National Anti-Poverty Organization, "Tax Rebate Discounting" (August, 1985)
66. Ibid., 1:23.
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people we have in this country scattered throughout this wide country of
ours should perform highly advocate-style services on behalf of taxpayers.
They have a job to do and it is a big one. 67
The sword placed above low-income taxpayers in this scenario is double
edged: as noted in the first section, Revenue Canada is reducing its commit-
ment to enforcement in the interests of becoming a service bureaucracy, thus
allowing high-income taxpayers increased opportunity and incentive to
engage in tax avoidance; simultaneously, however, the only service low-
income taxpayers truly need is privatized on the very rationale that Revenue
Canada is unsuited to providing such service to taxpayers. In both cases,
Revenue Canada's supposed insensitivity to the interests of taxpayers gener-
ally is used to justify policies that place low-income taxpayers, specifically,
in a less favourable positions Moreover, because of the distorted image of
Revenue Canada disseminated by advantaged taxpayers with an interest in
restraining the enforcement scope of the department, no political constitu-
ency has arisen in Canada lobbying for more vigorous or expanded tax
administration on behalf of the poor.68
The Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, notionally a bureaucracy
acting in the interests of low-income consumers, has come out clearly in
favour of the income tax industry. M. Cote, the minister at the time of the
1985 amendments, and a former Chartered Accountant, made the following
remarks regarding the government's proposals:
I think that the measures and the amounts that we are introducing are reason-
able. There is room to make a reasonable profit. And again, I have the pro-
tection of the consumer in mind when I introduced these measures. I am not
saying that I want to have the discounters out of business, but I think there is
enough room for them there to find their own interests.6 9 (my emphasis)
By removing the freedom of discounters to set whatever rates the market will
bear, the government through its regulation has provided discounters with a
secure, reliable and legitimate source of profit. This result, however, is neither
atypical nor surprising. That producer groups tend to exercise more influence
in the regulatory policy-making process has been well documented; more-
67. Ibid., 1:60.
68. See J. Gilles, "Federal Tax Reform in a Pluralistic State," in N. Brooks, ed., The
Quest for Tax Reform: The Royal Commission on Taxation Twenty Years Later
(Toronto: Carswell, 1988), 346.
69. Ibid., 2:22-3.
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over, producer groups continue to exercise this influence on the bureaucratic
organizations created to administer the regulatory apparatus established. 70
The minister, however, seemed favourably predisposed to the industry's
interests before the consultations even commenced. He stated baldly in his
submission that the government accepted the value of the tax discounting
industry. This acceptance, though, was not based on any concrete knowledge
of, or sensitivity to, the unique aspects of the industry for low-income
taxpayers, but on broad conservative political grounds. Consider Cote's
justification for the government's policy decision to preserve the discounting
industry:
First of all, I reject arguments favouring a complete ban on discounting. In a
free market economy, Canadians should be able to use discounters if they
wish. There is a demand for the service in the marketplace. On the other
hand, I would like to emphasize the importance of protecting consumers
against unscrupulous discounters and loan sharking. 71
The minister's remarks, of course, assume that all consumers are more or less
equally positioned in the marketplace, which is clearly not the case. As noted
above, the vast majority of people who go to tax discounters are poor. Tax
discounting does not represent for these clients an option to choose in a free
marketplace, but often the only option they have.72 Unlike middle-class
consumers, the poor are unable to access conventional sources of consumer
credit. Whether it be the result of job instability, educational deficiency,
insufficient income, or other factors related to socioeconomic disadvantage,
traditional lenders will not deal with this class of borrower.73
This lack of competition exists not only between tax discounters and other
credit sources for low-income consumers, but within the tax discounting field
as well. No major banks and only a scattering of credit unions and caisse
populaires offer a similar service to the tax discounters. This lack of compe-
tition encourages inefficiencies which are invariably borne by the consumer
in the long run.74 Low-income consumers, additionally, generate inefficien-
70. M. Trebilcock, R. Pritchard and L. Waverman, "The Consumer Interest and the
Regulatory Process," in A. Duggan and L. Darvall, eds., Consumer Protection Law
and Theory (Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1980), 266-7
71. Minutes, supra, note 31 at 2:4.
72. See Ramsay, supra, note 61 at 24-32.
73. D. Cayne and M.J. Trebilcock, "Market Considerations and Consumer Protection
Policy" (1973) 23 University of Toronto L.I. 396 at 399.,
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cies of their own; they are on average more likely to be buy impulsively,
engage in less long-term planning, are more easily pressured and generally
have more of a tendency toward psychoneurotic symptoms in consumer
situations. 75 Consumer credit exacerbates these tendenciesby both promot-
ing a "consumptive ethic," and "subverting the sovereignty of the consumer
over his own wants."'76
The Canadian approach with respect to consumer protection for the poor has
been to legislate interest rate ceilings, such as contained in the now defunct
Small Loans Act, though it addresses neither of the structural inefficiencies
noted above.77 Jacob Zeigel, in his brief to the Special Senate Committee on
Poverty in 1970, called for comprehensive and coherent interest rate ceilings
as a means of protecting unsophisticated borrowers and encouraging more
prudent vendor behaviour. What has resulted instead is a patchwork of
incoherent regulations and legislation that create an environment in which it
is difficult to know what rules apply to what kind of interest rates in relation
to which types of credit. Moreover, it is generally not difficult to either bury
additional interest charges in the cost of other goods or services or, as in the
case of tax discounting, to characterize the charge as something other than
interest on a loan-in this case, a commission on a buy-sell agreement.
Nonetheless, consumers are not only disempowered by those tax discounters
who violate or subvert the regulatory legislation governing the industry;
arguably, they are disempowered precisely by this protective legislation
itself. It is symbolic legislation, circumscribing rather than proscribing indus-
try practices; what is required in its place, I maintain, is substantive reform
aimed at the conditions that make possible (and profitable) the industry
itself. 78
74. See D. Caplovitz, The Poor Pay More (New York: 1963).
75. See Trebilcock and Cayne, supra note 73, at 406. The authors caution, "Effective
policy will, however, ultimately have to take into account the cultural conditions
which underlie the particular needs of the poor."
76. Trebilcock, supra, note 1 at 419.
77. See for a discussion of the repeal of this legislation and subesequent regulation, J.
Zeigel, B. Geva, and R. Cumming eds., Consumer and Commercial Transactions:
Cases, Text and Materials, 2 ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1990) 17. For a
postwar history of attempts to grapple with consumer protection, see E. Belobaba,
"The Development of Consumer Protection Legislation: 1945-84," in Royal Com-
mission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Study
Papers, vol. 50 (1985).
(1992) 8 Journal of Law and Social Policy
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD THE EMPOWERMENT
OF LOW-INCOME CONSUMERS
Trebilcock and Cayne in their survey of consumer protection policies in the
early 1970s note that the only category of legislative or regulatory action that
will clearly, and in all cases benefit or empower the poor, are redistributive
ones. Rather than intervening to encourage competition or set prices in the
market, the authors suggest considering an alternative strategy for transfer-
ring (and transforming) consumer power:
The graduated system of income taxation, for example, could be easily
geared to strike at excessive corporate or individual profits, and it has the
advantage of producing measurable consequences. In addition, it allows the
policy maker to rely on an administrative apparatus already in existence and
obviates the difficulty of defining precisely what constitutes an excess profit,
and that of delineating the markets in which such conditions exist.7 9
The problem is, however, that Canada's progressive income tax does not
redistribute income effectively. The wealthiest quintile of Canadians has
consistently accounted for between 41 and 43 per cent of total income earned
annually in Canada throughout the postwar era, while the poorest quintile has
accounted for between 3.6 and 5 per cent of total income earned annually. 80
Despite the redistributive promise of a progressive income tax, 81 the opera-
tion of this tax in Canada, along with the variety of regressive sales taxes and
property taxes that comprise Canada's "tax mix," has effectively allowed the
78. On the distinction between symbolic and substantive legislative action, see E.
Belobaba, "Unfair Trade Practices Legislation: Symbolism and Substance in Con-
sumer Protection" (1977) 15 Osgoode Hall L.J. 327 at 329. Belobaba draws this dis-
tinction on the criteria of government commitment to enforcement, without which,
he argues (at 387) "the paramountcy of symbolism over substance becomes inevita-
ble. Should this materialize, consumerism will confront one of its gravest challenges
to date: the realization that 'government ... has become the biggest consumer fraud
around."'
79. Supra, note 73 at 410.
80. See figures from Statistics Canada, Income Distribution by Size in Canada, Canada
Year Book, quoted in J.H. Perry, A Fiscal History of Canada-The Postwar Years,
Canadian Tax Paper No. 85 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1989), Table 28.1,
752.
81. Currently, the tax rate schedule is as follows: 17% on 28,275 or less; $4,807 + 26%
on the next $28,275; and on any income above $56,550, $12,158 + 29% on the
remainder. Provincial tax rates are added as a percentage of the federal tax rate; the
highest of these rate is 62% in Newfoundland, while the lowest is 44% in the North-
west Territories. Additionally, certain provinces impose a surtax-for example,
Ontario levies a surtax of 10% of tax over $10,000.
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rich to become enriched (and shelter their wealth), while simultaneously it
has hindered the poor from escaping poverty. Moreover, this has not hap-
pened accidentally, or as a result of the neutral machinations of an invisible
hand. Rather, in the concise opinion of Linda McQuaig, "we don't have a
progressive tax system because the rich have indicated that they don't want
one."82 As Neil Brooks argues, the impact of the income tax in Canada has
been, generally, to entrench and extend the inequalities produced by the
market:
The most striking feature of the Canadian tax system is its discrimination in
favour of the rich and the owners of property and against everyone else. The
overall tax system is viciously regressive: income from property bears a
much lighter tax burden than income from labour; many high-income tax-
payers and multinational corporations pay income tax at extremely low
effective rates and in some cases not at all; the government spends billions of
dollars in corporate tax expenditures and yet most have shown to be ineffec-
tive and to have an adverse impact on the economy; the income tax subsi-
dizes the lifestyles of the rich; and most personal tax expenditures benefit
high income taxpayers disproportionately more than low-income taxpay-
ers.
83
Given the starkly inequitable realities of market capitalism, a neutral income
tax has never been an option; it must either promote inequality or redress it.
Neutrality in the discourse of income taxation, rather, refers to provisions
that ideally do not privilege one kind of economic or social activity over
another. The goal of a neutral income tax is to tax people on the basis of the
choices they make (whether to devote their income to savings or consump-
tion, to real estate or retail, and so on), not to make the income tax itself the
basis for those choices. However, the operation of the income tax's adminis-
tration clearly does promote certain taxpayer behaviour. With respect to high
income taxpayers, it provides the rationale for the existence of the tax
planning industry and, as noted in the first section, a flourishing practitioner
community of lawyers and accountants; with respect to low-income taxpay-
ers, as discussed above, it provides the opportunity on which tax discounting
depends for its existence.
A neutral income tax, as well as an equitable one, are both goals that are
advanced by putting an end to the practice of tax discounting. Milczynski
concludes her review of income tax rebate discounting by suggesting that the
82. L McQuaig, Behind Closed Doors (Toronto: Viking, 1987), xxvii.
83. N. Brooks, "Future Directions in Canadian Tax Law Scholarship," (1985) 23
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 471.
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federal or provincial government simply provide, at minimal cost, the rebate
service to people expecting a refund who fall below a pre-determined level
of income. She acknowledges, however, that this still amounts to the satis-
faction of a market that ought not to exist at all:
The Tax Rebate Discounting Act was not enacted in response to the demands
by consumers to have access to such a service. The "demand" came later,
after the Act had the effect of establishing and officially sanctioning tax dis-
counting as a form of financial service. The Act was originally designed to
dispense with the scattered nefarious operations charging astronomical rates.
It was only after 1979 that the large companies with substantial advertising
budgets entered into and effectively took over the market. Thus, it was the
passage of the Tax Rebate Discounting Act that fuelled the growth of tax dis-
counting and essentially caused many of its problems.8 4
This claim requires elaboration. After all, as the pawnbroking industry
demonstrates, there has always been a need for small loans to high-risk, low
income consumers. 85 Pawnbroking, like tax discounting, is an industry that
relies for its sustenance on the disempowerment of low-income consumers,
and the inescapable lure of consumption that the power of credit holds for
them. Interestingly, to avoid the patchwork of regulations and interest rate
ceilings that have sprung up in the United States, pawnbrokers like the tax
discounters in Canada, have begun characterizing their business as a buy-sell
agreement rather than as a loan.86 Regulation of pawnbroking in the United
States has had, on a much larger scale, a similar impact on the industry as
regulating tax discounters in Canada. Small pawnbrokers have been squeezed
out of the American market as multi-outlet chain pawnbrokers expand-
"Cash America," for example, now boasts 120 outlets in four states. The
pawnbroker industry also claims that it provides a socially useful function
by extending credit to those whose only other alternative would be a loan
shark.87
As this analogy indicates, tax discounters did not invent the demand for small
loans over short time periods. What the discounters did accomplish, rather,
was the partial privatization of the income tax, and it is this privatization that
responds to a need that did not exist before the industry emerged. Given the
84. Milczynski, supra, note 2 at 86.
85. For a colourful and apologetic history of pawnbroking, see J. Oeltjen, "Pawnbroking
on Parade" (1989) 37 Buffalo L.Rev. 751.
86. Ibid., at 755.
87. See J. Oeltjen, "Pawnbroking: Coming to America" (1990) 38 Buffalo L. Rev. 223.
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redistributive intent of Canada's income tax, the privatization of tax admin-
istration for the poor is particularly offensive. Like any privatization scheme,
power is removed from any political institution at least nominally account-
able to all segments of society and is entrusted to the market which is
accountable only to the extent of a consumer's wealth and influence. If
privatization is the crux of the discounting dilemma, then the solution lies
not with price controls and market regulation, but with the government
assuming its appropriate responsibilities for tax administration.
In the view of Reuben Hasson, "the solution to the tax discounting problem is
extremely simple. Since the government has withheld too much tax from a class
of taxpayers, the government owes those taxpayers precisely the amount of tax
withheld. That amount should be paid as soon as possible. 88 Other critics, as
we have seen, call alternatively for taking the discounters' market away by
deregulating the industry and encouraging banks and other financial institutions
to offer more competitive rates on high-risk, small loans.89
I would go further, contending that what is at issue is not only a technical
problem of providing refunds on time, or a fiscal policy dilemma of making
available short-term credit on less usurious terms; rather, it is bound up in a
deeper problem of how interventionalist the income tax process ought to be
in empowering low-income citizens. As mentioned at the outset, the grist for
the mill of tax discounting is not insufficient credit for the poor, but insuffi-
cient income, and at a structural level, insufficient power in the market and
in legal and political institutions. As the policy process surrounding reforms
to the TRDA revealed, the interests of low-income consumers rarely deter-
mine the government's consumer protection legislative agenda.
In my view, to conclude, Revenue Canada's mandate ought to include an
advocacy role on behalf of the poor, both in increased enforcement to ensure
compliance by high-income taxpayers, and in increased service to low-
income taxpayers, including the timely delivery of refunds and credits and
any aid required in filling out returns. This would not, of course, redress the
inequities that undermine the redistributive potential of the income tax, but
it would result in the abolition of private tax discounters. Moreover, it would
also serve as an important step towards the social and political empowerment
of low-income taxpayers, which is a precondition of progressive tax reform
and the harbinger of social justice for consumers in the marketplace.
88. Hasson, supra, note 4.
89. See Trebilcock, supra, note 1 at 451; see also Belobaba, supra, note 4.
